# Security

## What protects your funds

- **The program re-checks everything.** The gateway verifies signatures and terms, but the program verifies them again at fill. A bad gateway cannot make you pay more than your signed price, for another market, or for a nonce below your floor.
- **Per-market signing domains.** A signature for one market can never be replayed on another.
- **Your own limits.** Exposure, mint policy caps and the premium budget are enforced on chain and set only by your authority.
- **Brakes you own.** Pausing your mint policy stops every fill at once, and a hot watcher key can do it. Raising `min_nonce` cancels every outstanding quote for good. See [Cancel quotes](https://docs.covr.markets/guides/cancel-quotes.md).

## What you must protect

| Secret | If it leaks |
| --- | --- |
| Quote key | Someone can sign quotes in your name, fill them against your vault, sign early-close buybacks of your open positions and, if you created a purchase policy, buy positions with your vault. See [If your quote key leaks](#if-your-quote-key-leaks). |
| Authority | Someone can withdraw your vault and change your settings. |
| Gateway token | Someone can read your RFQ feed and take your 16 connection slots, locking your bot out with `4429`. They cannot bid or quote: both must be signed by your quote key. If desks can be listed in future, they could also set the customer's no-quote note, which needs no signature. Message us on Telegram: [@malviyaop](https://t.me/malviyaop) to revoke it. |

## If your quote key leaks

Raising `min_nonce` to your next journal nonce is **not** enough. Whoever holds the key can sign:

- **new quotes** above that floor, valid until a market's expiry, and fill them against your vault themselves (the 60-second quote limit is the gateway's rule, not the program's);
- **early-close buybacks** of your open positions. The writer of an open position can close it against you for as little as 1 USDC atom, and a writer can hand a position to anyone without your signature. You lose the value of those calls.
- **position purchases** paid from your vault, up to your purchase policy's caps, if you created a purchase policy (`buy_position_v3`).

Do this, in order:

1. **Pause your mint policy at once.** Your authority or your watcher can do it. No new fill on that mint can land while it is paused, and your vault cannot be made to buy a position (`buy_position_v3`).
2. **Retire the key:** set `min_nonce` to `2^64 − 1` with `configureMaker`, passing your current operator back. Pausing does not stop early closes; only this does.
3. **Keep the policy paused** and, if you like, withdraw the vault to your authority's USDC account (`withdraw` in the SDK, authority only). Once paused and retired, no quote-key signature can move your USDC. Only your authority (withdraw, exercise) and your operator, if set (exercise), can.
4. **Exercise what you still hold.** To exercise the old maker's open positions, keep or deposit their strikes in the old vault before expiry, or flash exercise them under a flash policy of the old Maker. Neither needs the quote key.
5. **Start again with a new quote key:** register it as a new maker with the same authority and run setup for it. For a new gateway token for the new address: Message us on Telegram: [@malviyaop](https://t.me/malviyaop).

Before step 1 lands, forged fills and purchases are capped by your vault balance and your limits: the premium budget (shared by both), the mint policy's lifetime premium limit for fills, and the purchase policy's per-order and lifetime caps for purchases. Set them with this in mind. Forged early closes stop only at step 2.

## Audit status

covr is in beta. The program has not yet had a third-party audit. Size your limits with that in mind.

## Reporting a vulnerability

Report it privately. Message us on Telegram: [@malviyaop](https://t.me/malviyaop). Do not open a public issue.

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Source: https://docs.covr.markets/resources/security · Part of covr Docs, https://docs.covr.markets/llms.txt
